(2012) , Cal.App.4th, [No. C067138. Third Dist. Mar. 29, 2012 as modified Apr. 26, 2012]
In this case, Plaintiff Jamulians Against the Casino (JAC) contested the execution of an April 2009 settlement agreement between Caltrans (signed by Iwasaki) and the Jamul Indian Village. The purpose of the settlement agreement was to resolve federal litigation between those parties over application of CEQA to the Tribe’s efforts to upgrade its interchange on State Route 94 to allow for access to a proposed casino. JAC alleged the Agreement itself was subject to review procedures in CEQA before Caltrans could execute the Agreement. JAC premised this theory on an argument that Caltrans had committed itself, in the Agreement, to granting a permit for the interchange upgrade. The Tribe made a special appearance to quash the summons (raising the doctrine of sovereign immunity) and seeking dismissal of the action, asserting that the Tribe was an indispensible party without whom the action could not proceed. Caltrans demurred arguing that the Agreement did not constitute a “project” subject to CEQA and did not commit it to granting a permit.
The key issues addressed in the case from a planner’s perspective are:
- If the agreement a project subject to CEQA – The appellate court does not address the issue of whether the agreement was itself subject to CEQA as part of this case, since the appellate court found that the trial court’s action on the demurrer was inappropriate. However, the appellate court does list the trial court’s reasoning for why the agreement was not subject to CEQA, and that reasoning is instructive for CEQA practitioners. As detailed in the opinion: “In its order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action, the trial court stated, “[the Agreement] does not include or reference plans for a casino project that are sufficiently defined or specific to allow meaningful rather than merely speculative review of potential impacts. Nor does [the Agreement] bind [Caltrans] to any particular casino design or action in support of a casino project, effectively preclude alternatives or mitigation measures appropriate for consideration under CEQA, or foreclose {Slip Opn. Page 7} a ‘no project’ alternative . . . . [Citation.] [¶] . . . Section [3.A.] of [the Agreement] requires [the Tribe] to follow [Caltrans’s] processes for the creation of [a] . . . project scoping document (‘PSD’) and environmental documentation (‘ED’), ‘which is subject to final approval and adoption by [Caltrans], in order to analyze all reasonably feasible alternatives for access to the Project’ [(Agreement, § 3.A.4.), and] to conduct a traffic study [(Agreement, § 3.A.5.)] . . . . [¶] Section [3.B. of the Agreement] requires [Caltrans] to . . . process [the Tribe’s] completed . . . permit application [diligently] . . . and to issue [a] . . . permit once mitigation measures are approved and the permit process is completed. Contrary to the allegations of the petition and complaint, section [3.B. of the Agreement] does not commit [Caltrans] to approving the project regardless of the adequacy of the project design, environmental impact analysis and identified mitigation measures. Read in context and reasonably interpreted, the terms of section [3.B. of the Agreement] require [Caltrans] to issue [a] . . . permit only after determining that [the Tribe] has complied with CEQA . . . . [Caltrans] retain[s] discretion under section [3.B.] to reject [the Tribe’s] permit application upon a determination that [the Tribe] has not complied with CEQA requirements.” fn. 6 (Italics added.) {Slip Opn. Page 8}”
- Whether the trial court exceeded the proper scope of judicial review in its ruling on a demurrer – As noted by the appellate court: “In ruling on a demurrer, it is thus error to take judicial notice of the terms of an ordinary document submitted in support or interpret the terms”; ‘a court cannot by means of judicial notice convert a demurrer into an incomplete evidentiary hearing in which the demurring party can present documentary evidence {Slip Opn. Page 9} and the opposing party is bound by what that evidence appears to show.’ (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 115; accord, C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1103-1104; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 605.).” Because the trial court exceeded the proper scope of judicial review, the trial court’s action dismissing the action was reversed and the matter was remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a new order overruling the demurrer of Caltrans, and to consider the hybrid motion of the Tribe to quash-dismiss on its merits.
- The definition of a indispensible party – The appellate court states: “There are four relevant criteria to consider on this issue: (1) the extent to which a judgment would prejudice the absent party; fn. 9 (2) the extent to which measures are available to mitigate any prejudice; (3) the ability of the court to address the issues in the absence of the party; and (4) the adequacy of the plaintiff’s alternate remedies if the action is dismissed. fn. 10 (Deltakeeper, at pp. 1107-1108; Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (b).) {Slip Opn. Page 13}”